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Abstract 
The private rented sector in England contains some of the least energy efficient 
properties in the country and houses more vulnerable households than any other 
sector. Occupants endure dangerously cold homes and fuel poverty but have no 
direct influence over the energy performance of their homes. The choices that 
occupants make regarding energy are constrained by the material characteristics of 
a property: something only the landlord can alter. Enduringly poor conditions in the 
sector indicate that an initiative that convinces landlords of the benefits of improving 
energy efficiency remains elusive. Based on a review of existing research and 30 
interviews with landlords, this paper identifies factors which deter landlords from 
acting to improve energy efficiency. Factors include lack of knowledge regarding the 
consequences of energy inefficiency and possible solutions, the absence of direct 
financial incentives (the principal-agent problem), local housing market and cultural 
factors. It also identifies a number of motivating factors that may encourage 
landlords to invest in energy efficiency.  It is argued that policies to tackle energy 
inefficiency in the sector should take account of these factors in order to improve 
effectiveness.  
Key words 
Private rented sector, domestic energy efficiency, principal-agent, The Green Deal, 
private landlords, split incentive 
  
  
Introduction  
The private rented sector (PRS) in England contains some of the poorest quality and 
least energy efficient properties in the country as well as housing more vulnerable 
households than any other sector. Similar issues exist in many countries around the 
world including New Zealand and the USA [1].1 Occupants of such properties endure 
dangerously cold homes and fuel poverty but have little direct influence over the 
energy performance of the properties they live in.  The choices that occupants make 
regarding energy consumption and the amount of money they spend on it are, to a 
large extent, constrained by the material characteristics of a property (such as its 
thermal performance and mode of heating): something only the landlord can alter.  
Enduringly poor conditions in the sector attest that not enough is known about how 
to persuade private landlords to improve the energy performance of their properties. 
By drawing on insights from a case study of private landlords of poorly performing 
properties in a town in the north of England, this paper aims to add to our 
understanding of what discourages landlords from taking action to improve energy 
efficiency and how these barriers might be overcome.  By better understanding 
landlords' decision making processes, the paper also aims to identify factors which 
may be harnessed to motivate landlords to invest in energy efficiency. 
Energy efficiency in the English private rented sector  
The PRS in England has grown rapidly since the end of the last decade (English 
Housing Survey 2012/13). Of the 22.8m households in England in 2011, 4 million 
were living in privately rented housing: an increase of 1.6m in six years [2].  
  
Despite this huge growth, levels of energy efficiency within the sector are very poor 
compared to other sectors as attested by various figures provided by the Association 
for the Conservation of Energy (ACE) [2]. ACE report that the PRS contains a higher 
proportion (11%) of the most energy inefficient homes (those in bands F and G of the 
Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) scale than any other sector.2  By comparison, 
less than 2% of social housing is F or G rated. In 2011 nearly half the households 
living in privately rented F and G rated homes were in fuel poverty: higher than in 
both the social rented and owner-occupied sectors [2].3 
The consequences of these conditions for residents of the sector are equally well 
documented and the evidence paints a clear picture of vulnerable tenants enduring 
dangerously cold homes that are unaffordable to heat [2, 3, 4, 5].  Indeed, the PRS 
has the highest incidence of ‘excess cold’ of all English housing tenures. Over 
400,000 private rental homes – 15 per cent of the total – are classified as a Category 
One ‘excess cold’ hazard under the Housing Health and Safety Rating System 
(HHSRS) [6] meaning that they are so cold that they pose a threat to health.4  5 
Compounding these issues, the sector houses a higher proportion of vulnerable 
individuals than any other sector [7]. Previous research has established that 
vulnerable individuals are, despite being the most adversely affected by poor living 
conditions, amongst the least empowered consumers and therefore unlikely to lobby 
landlords for improvements [1,3,8]. The position of dissatisfied tenants is weakened 
further by unsupportive case law which has established that any person taking on a 
lease for a property takes it as it stands [1], giving tenants little recourse to request 
improvements once living in a  property. In 2007, there were 3.1 million vulnerable 
households living in private housing, of which 61per cent occupied 'non-decent' 
  
accommodation, as defined by the UK government. 6 7 Of this 61 per cent, 48 per 
cent were private rented sector tenants [7].  
The absence of minimum energy efficiency standards within the PRS, mean that 
options for tackling the problem of widespread energy inefficiency and its many 
corollaries are limited.  Indeed, the only regulation of quality within the sector comes 
in the form of the HHSRS under which local authorities can require improvements to 
be made to properties deemed to represent an excess cold hazard (as previously 
defined). However, this system arguably doesn't go far enough in terms of 
addressing energy inefficiency, as it requires conditions to be extremely poor before 
it can be implemented and relies on such conditions being brought to the attention of 
the local authority, either by the tenant or a third party. Energy Performance 
Certificates (EPCs), which provide information about a property's energy 
performance (rated on a scale of A-G) and costs and how this might be improved, 
have also been mandatory for all rental properties let since 2008. However, although 
they may raise awareness of energy performance amongst both landlords and 
tenants, there are currently no consequences for letting out a poorly performing 
property. 
There is a reasonable level of consensus within the policy literature as to how poor 
conditions in the PRS have become entrenched. Dominant explanations cite market 
factors which emphasise how high demand and low supply leave consumers in a 
weak position, combined with a lack of regulatory intervention. Shelter describes this 
situation in their report on conditions within the PRS, which states that: 'where 
demand outstrips supply, renters lack basic consumer power to bargain for better 
conditions.' Barton [1] elaborates by highlighting how, for various reasons, low 
  
income groups are often in the weakest positions in terms of negotiating 
improvements to their homes, stating that 'poor people tend to live in rental housing 
[they are] more likely to have weak market power to bargain […] about the state of 
the dwelling.' This is particularly the case in Great Britain where reforms to the 
housing benefit systems since 2010 have resulted in fewer landlords being willing to 
offer housing benefit claimants a tenancy, forcing the most vulnerable in to the least 
desirable locations and properties [9,10,11,12]. 
There is no doubt that demand for PRS properties continues to rise in a post 2008 
climate where house building rates remain low, mortgages are difficult to secure and 
the social housing sector is contracting [13]. It is also clear that as demand increases, 
housing choice amongst private renters becomes increasingly constrained at the 
same time as rent levels continue to rise [13]. Under these conditions, the majority of 
landlords will have little difficulty letting their properties and continue to experience 
steady growth in rent levels [13]. There is therefore little incentive for them to invest 
in anything other than essential repairs. This situation demands a robust regulatory 
response or powerful financial incentives [5].  
In 2011, a response from the UK government was finally forthcoming in the form of 
the Energy Act 2011 which states that from 2016 legislation to drive up 
environmental performance in the sector will be introduced. From April 2016 
landlords will be unable to refuse requests from tenants for 'reasonable' energy 
efficiency improvements and from April 2018 all PRS properties must achieve a 
minimum EPC rating of E (where this is physically and economically possible). There 
are some obvious flaws in this legislation which suggest that it is unlikely to impact 
significantly on the problem, particularly at the lower end of the market. First, the 
  
2016 legislation relies on tenants feeling sufficiently empowered to request 
improvements [1,3] and landlords making the requested improvements. Questions 
remain regarding how the legislation will be enforced and what will be considered a 
'reasonable' request. The legislation, as it stands, permits exemptions on various 
grounds including where the achievement of an E rating would result in a net 
decrease in a property's value. Although welcomed as a step in the right direction, 
the legislation has been criticised for not going far enough due to the various caveats 
and exemptions it sets out and its reliance on finance mechanisms that may not exist 
when it comes into force [2]. 
There are many reasons why regulatory action has been slow to manifest and 
heavily caveated when it has arrived. A key concern relates to chronic housing 
shortages in the UK which gives rise to nervousness that the enforcement of 
minimum quality standards within the PRS may lead to an exodus of landlords from 
the market [9,10,11,12]. Although it seems unlikely that landlords will try to sell on 
properties when owner occupation continues to fall and property prices remain below 
2008 levels for much of the country [14]. Concerns about an exodus are possibly 
more valid within London and the South East where property values continue to rise 
sharply. However, other more immediate concerns such as reductions in the Local 
Housing Allowance and the direct payment of housing benefit to tenants appear 
more likely to encourage landlords at the lower end of the market to take their 
properties out of the rental market [9,10,11,12]. 8  
Landlords of pre-1919 properties are also concerned that it may be practically and 
financially difficult for them to improve energy performance to the required level [15]. 
Whilst it is true that pre-1919 properties are both difficult to treat and prevalent within 
  
the PRS (accounting for 37 per cent of the sector compared to 7 per cent in social 
housing and 20 per cent of owner occupied properties) [16], these concerns are 
refuted by a number of recent publications. 9  One such example includes research 
by Griffiths [17] which found that, of a representative sample of 3000 houses in Great 
Britain, every dwelling was capable of achieving an EPC rating of E at a cost of 
between £1,400 and £3,500 per property and without resorting to unconventional 
measures beyond the building regulations. Moreover, a similar study by the Energy 
Savings Trust [15] found that even the hardest to treat F and G rated homes (those 
with average fuel bills of £2,700 per annum) would cost an average of £5,800 per 
property to improve to a D rating. This latter study also revealed that even the most 
modest investments (i.e. loft insulation at £900) could yield annual energy bill 
savings of £190 per household.  Another recent study from the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC) [18]  also suggested that there may even be 
longer term benefits for landlords willing to invest in energy efficiency, stating that 
such investments will be recompensed by property value increases of between 
£15,000 and £42,000 depending on location. 
Furthermore, research from New Zealand, where climatic conditions and private 
housing conditions mirror that of the UK, gives a clear indication that the benefits of 
energy efficiency improvements extend beyond financial gains to impact significantly 
on the health of tenants [19]. 
In advance of the Energy Act, efforts to improve energy performance in the PRS rely 
on voluntary incentive based initiatives such as the UK government's current flagship 
domestic energy efficiency programme, The Green Deal and linked scheme, The 
Energy Company Obligation (ECO).  The Green Deal is a financing mechanism 
using private finance (provided by an accredited Green Deal provider e.g. an energy 
  
provider or other private company) to pay for domestic energy efficiency 
improvements. The loan is repaid by the occupant using the savings they make on 
their energy bills as a result of the measures installed. The Green Deal has 
ostensibly been designed to protect the consumer via a clause known as 'The 
Golden Rule' whereby the loan repayments should not exceed the amount saved on 
energy bills through the measures funded. In other words, tenants' bills should not 
increase as a result of taking out a Green Deal loan.  
The obligation to repay the loan is passed from tenant to tenant in the PRS or owner 
to owner in owner occupied properties. The consent of both the landlord and the 
tenant are required to take out a Green Deal loan. Vulnerable groups and those 
living in properties deemed by a Green Deal Assessor to be 'hard to treat' may be 
eligible for subsided measures under the ECO. The Green Deal and ECO can be 
used in tandem to finance improvements.  
The Green Deal has been widely criticised for its technical and legal complexity, 
regressive nature, for being unattractive to the consumer (due to high interest rates 
and perceived impacts on property values) and for being tailored to the requirements 
of middle class home owners over and above the low income groups least likely to 
adopt energy saving measures [1,20,21,22]. The initiative has, however, been 
designed to ensure that there are no capital costs to the landlord ostensibly in a bid 
to tackle one of the most commonly identified barriers to improving energy efficiency 
in the PRS: the so-called 'landlord-tenant' problem, discussed in more detail in the 
following section, whereby the landlord is not willing to invest in energy efficiency 
improvements as the benefits will be felt by the tenants and are unlikely to impact on 
the rent they are able to charge [1]. 
  
Due to its departure from classic grant-based initiatives common in the past in the 
UK, academic and policy interest in the Green Deal has been significant, even 
beyond the UK. Indeed New Zealand academic Barton [1] stated that 'Once the 
Green Deal gets underway, it will provide insights into a determined effort to bring 
energy efficiency improvements into the private rental sector.' In stating this Barton 
underlines the need for research into the effectiveness of the Green Deal as an 
approach to improving energy efficiency in the PRS which aims to tackle the 
'landlord-tenant' problem by passing responsibility for the cost of energy efficiency 
measures on to the tenant. 
Take up of the Green Deal has been unprecedentedly low with just a few hundred 
loans having been taken out since its introduction in 2012 [23]. ECO, which, if taken 
alone, reflects a more traditional grant-based approach, has been more successful, 
having delivered insulation improvements to around half a million homes [23]. 
However, the success of ECO is relative to the poor performance of the Green Deal 
and is likely to have impacted very little on the situations of the almost two million 
vulnerable households living in 'non-decent' accommodation in the UK [7], not least 
because ECO support is not exclusively available to vulnerable households and can 
be issued to more affluent households living in 'hard to treat' homes.  
The failure of the Green Deal, ECO and a raft of previous and parallel initiatives 
(including EPCs) to impact on the problem, as attested by enduringly poor conditions 
in the PRS, gives a strong indication that not enough is known about what deters 
landlords from taking what policy makers believe is rational action [1]. Indeed, the 
majority of research into the attitudes and perceptions of PRS landlords has been 
quantitative and has neglected to explore the psychological and social factors behind 
landlords' decisions and behaviour [24]. Overall, it is evident that little progress has 
  
been made over at least the last two decades, since the 1991 English House 
Condition Survey first highlighted the problem of poor energy performance in the 
PRS, to develop policies and initiatives that convince landlords of the benefits of 
making energy efficiency improvements [25]. 
This paper seeks to help address this deficit in our understanding of what deters and 
motivates landlords to act through the provision of empirical evidence revealing 
insights into their decision making processes regarding investment in energy 
efficiency. Before reporting the findings of this research, it is important to establish 
what can be gleaned from the existing literature about what prevents landlords from 
acting to improve energy efficiency. 
What do we already know about what prevents landlords from acting? 
A handful of key sources [1, 22, 25, 26] point to a 'mismatch' within the PRS between 
the party paying the costs (the landlord) and the beneficiaries of the improvements 
(the tenant). This, they argue, represents a failure of the market dubbed the 'tenant-
landlord problem' [27] and is the predominant reason for poor energy performance 
within the PRS. This problem has been described variously as the 'principal-agent' or 
'split incentive' problem. These concepts are used to describe a situation whereby 
the landlord (the agent) determines the level of energy performance within a building, 
while the tenant (the principal) pays the energy bills [28]. This well established 
argument continues that, where principals are poorly informed about energy 
efficiency then they are unlikely to be willing to pay a premium for an energy efficient 
property. Knowing this, the agent is unwilling to invest or will underinvest in energy 
efficiency on the basis that they will not be able to recoup the cost of their 
  
investments through sale or rent of the property [29]. The 'split-incentive' theory 
operates similarly [2].  
Jaffe and Stavins [29] and Jakob [30] introduce another dimension to this debate in 
their respective discussions of energy saving technology adoption rates, positing that 
it is costly and time consuming for individuals to learn enough about an innovation to 
understand whether it is profitable and how to use it. This, they contend, is a 
significant market barrier to innovative technology adoption. The argument continues 
that landlords are less likely to dedicate time to acquiring knowledge regarding the 
drawbacks, benefits, supply, financing and installation of an innovation than those 
who pay the energy bills. The tenant however, does not have a mandate to make 
such decisions. Moreover, they contend that even if landlords were persuaded to 
dedicate time to this, they would likely find inconclusive evidence regarding likely 
payback periods, particularly given uncertainties over future energy prices, rendering 
them unable to reach an informed decision.  Hope and Booth [24] also point to a lack 
of knowledge regarding energy efficiency amongst landlords surveyed through their 
research, having identified that the majority considered the energy performance of 
their properties to be good, when this is unlikely to be the case. However, they go on 
to caution that educating landlords is unlikely to automatically foster pro-
environmental behaviour as the drivers of this are rather more complex than that [24]. 
The principal-agent/split incentive problem and issues of knowledge deficit resonate 
across different contexts, having been widely identified in the UK, USA, Europe, 
Australia and New Zealand. There is, however, less coverage within the literature 
regarding solutions and policy responses. Jaffe and Stavins [29] offer some relevant 
opinions in relation to increasing uptake of energy saving technology arguing that 
where barriers have a market dimension (i.e. the principal-agent problem) then 
  
government should intervene. In relation to non-market issues, incentives should be 
applied. Economic incentives and regulation can be equally effective under different 
circumstances, they assert. This point is supported by Bradbrook [22] who concluded 
that a combined 'carrot and stick' approach was desirable, bringing together 
incentives such as tax credits alongside legal requirements and Scanlon and Kochan 
[31]  argue that incentives are essential to promote action amongst landlords 
operating as small businesses. Gabriel and Watson [32] and Hope and Booth [24] 
add that, in relation to both regulations and incentives, the problem requires a more 
targeted response tailored to the particular dynamics of different segments of the 
PRS (i.e. large and small landlords), something that energy policy has so far 
neglected to do [31,33]. 
The existing literature therefore offers a number of hypotheses that can be taken 
forward in the analysis of the empirical data presented later in this paper, including 
market and non-market barriers to landlords investing in energy efficiency, such as:  
a lack of knowledge amongst landlords in relation to energy efficiency [24,29,30], the 
presence of the principal-agent problem, high demand for rental properties [3] and a 
lack of demand for improvements amongst disempowered tenants [1,8].  
This paper aims to add to the existing literature in two main ways.  First, by providing 
contemporary insights into factors deterring landlords from investing in energy 
efficiency, gleaned through detailed qualitative research. Second, by providing a 
case study of a current policy intervention (the Green Deal) and analysis of possible 
reasons why it may have failed to impact on the problem it was designed to tackle. 
As Barton emphasises, exploring the factors behind the disappointing performance 
of the Green Deal is particularly important in light of the fact that it should, in passing 
  
the cost of the improvements on to the tenant, circumvent the principal-agent 
problem.  
Methods  
The data informing this paper was collected as part of a research contract between 
the author and a local authority in a town in the North of England. The research was 
commissioned to enable a better understanding of how the local authority might 
encourage landlords to improve the energy performance of their properties 
particularly through the Green Deal and ECO, launched at the time of the research in 
2012.  
To gain a detailed and nuanced understanding of landlords' attitudes towards making 
improvements, in depth qualitative interviews were employed. A total of 30 interviews 
were conducted over three months. This approach goes some way towards 
rebalancing the evidence base in relation to landlords' attitudes and perceptions of 
energy efficiency, which has to date been largely quantitative in nature, neglecting to 
shed light on the reasons underpinning landlords' inertia and the less tangible 
aspects of their decision making processes [24].  
All interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes and covered a number of standard 
themes including: becoming a landlord, portfolio and business models, awareness of 
energy efficiency policy and likelihood of taking up the Green Deal. 
All of the landlords in the sample had poorly performing properties within their 
portfolios with a Standard Assessment Rating (SAP) of 38/100 or below. 10 11 A SAP 
rating of 21 to 38 is equivalent to an F rated property on the EPC scale and 1 to 20 is 
a G. The town suffers multiple deprivation and the majority of participating landlords 
  
owned low value properties let to low-income tenants. Like most former industrial 
towns in England, the housing stock is predominantly pre-1919. 
Interviewees varied in terms of the size of their portfolios, owning anything from one 
to 200 properties in the area.  
Due to the relatively small sample size and the fact that the research was focussed 
in one location, it cannot be claimed that this study is representative of the sector as 
a whole. Instead, the data collected sheds light on the perceptions of landlords 
operating at the lower end of the rental market and whose properties are amongst 
the most poorly performing (although fairly typical of the English urban housing 
stock). The sample could therefore be said to represent a group of landlords who 
face particularly stubborn barriers to property improvement. It is likely that the 
findings presented would resonate across similar contexts, certainly across the 
urban north and midlands of England and perhaps more widely still (housing market 
dynamics in the South and particularly the South East tend to operate differently) [9].   
Recognising the heterogeneity of the sector and of landlords [32], it is strongly 
advocated that similar studies are conducted across a diverse range of contexts to 
enable the most comprehensive insights possible into the motivations and decision 
making processes of different types of landlords. 
Findings:  Why don't landlords act on energy efficiency? 
70 per cent of respondents perceived no benefits to making energy efficiency 
improvements to their properties.  Those who would consider this said they would 
only do so if grant funding or subsidy was made available.  This section explores the 
  
reasons behind landlords' reluctance to improve the energy efficiency of their 
properties in the case study area.  
Lack of knowledge and misinformation  
The work of Hope and Booth [24] highlighted a paucity of knowledge and 
understanding in relation to energy efficiency amongst landlords and Jaffe and 
Stavins [29] and Jakob [30] highlight how this knowledge deficit can deter landlords 
from taking action. If landlords are not aware of the deficiencies of their properties 
and the associated consequences for both tenants and the physical fabric of the 
property then there will, of course, be no impetus to act. Moreover, even if landlords 
are aware of such deficiencies they may be deterred from acting by a lack of 
knowledge of the potential solutions and by misconceptions about cost or practical 
feasibility. As Jaffe and Stavins [29] and Jakob [30] emphasise, understanding the 
issues and potential solutions requires a significant investment of time and can be 
confusing without technical knowledge. Recognising these issues, discussions with 
landlords commenced by exploring their awareness of the energy performance of 
their properties.  
The majority (around 70 per cent) of respondents were aware of the energy 
performance ratings of their properties as detailed in the EPC. Most also understood 
that their properties performed poorly (most rated as E or below on the EPC scale). 
However, respondents were keen to qualify and 'normalise' this situation, 
emphasising their belief that there would be very few properties in the town that 
achieved anything above a D rating due to the prevalence of pre-1919 housing.  
'I know that it's [the property] an E rating from the EPC but I also know that it's no 
different to the vast majority of houses in [the town]. They were all built at around the 
  
same time and are not up to modern standards. So I'm offering the same product as 
everyone else.' (Landlord, 10 properties) 
It appeared that poor energy performance was regarded as the 'norm' in the town 
and that poor conditions were largely accepted by landlords. The previous quote also 
suggests that the heterogeneity of the local housing stock dis-incentivises 
improvement as there is very little 'competition' within the market from better 
performing properties. Several landlords also felt a sense of hopelessness, 
questioning how much impact they could make on such a widespread problem. 
Perceptions that the housing stock locally was no longer fit for purpose were 
common but equally, there was recognition that mass demolition was not practically 
possible or politically palatable.  
'There's a bigger problem here that me improving my few little houses isn't going to 
solve and that’s the fact that the housing in this town as with many others needs 
rebuilding.  We need to start again but for many reasons that just can't happen.' 
(Landlord, 4 properties) 
Landlords' also frequently questioned the extent to which it was possible to improve 
the energy performance of individual properties. Misconceptions about the degree to 
which pre-1919 housing of the type prevalent in the town could be improved to 
above an E rating as forthcoming legislation will require, were common. The quote 
below illustrates this but also alludes to another issue: the conflation by landlords of 
general improvements and maintenance with energy efficiency improvements. For 
example, the landlord appears to believe that a new roof should contribute to uplift in 
energy performance. The quote also suggests that only 'traditional' insulation and 
gas central heating have been considered as a means of improving energy 
  
performance. No mention is made of micro-renewables or solid wall insulation (SWI), 
for example.  
'We renovated the property when we bought it. Extended it, re-roofed it, put in gas 
central heating, insulated the loft and it's still only an E rating. It's misleading because 
with a period property like this, that's about the best you'll ever achieve.' (Landlord, 2 
properties) 
The belief that a pre-1919 terraced property cannot exceed a D or E rating is 
challenged by the results of the 'Super Homes' project which found that that 
traditional terraced housing of the type found in the case study area can achieve an 
A rating. 12 This does however require significant investment and respondents were 
wary of investing more money in their properties than their value can support. This 
issue is revisited later in the paper. 
Despite evidence that the requirement for EPCs had raised landlords' awareness of 
the energy performance of their properties, the majority of respondents viewed them 
as a bureaucratic exercise and saw little value in them.  These views were reinforced 
by the perception that tenants reportedly seldom asked to see EPCs or asked 
questions about energy costs. The majority of respondents contended that the 
condition and location of the property and a 'fair' rent remained tenants' primary 
considerations.  
'Nobody is interested in EPC ratings, all tenants are concerned with is the condition 
of the place and how much you are charging.' (Letting agent, 200+ properties) 
  
The principal-agent problem 
The principal-agent problem emphasises the mismatch between who pays for 
energy efficiency measures (usually the landlord) and who benefits from them 
(usually the tenant). Under this arrangement the landlord has little incentive to invest, 
due to the widely held belief that it would yield no financial benefits for them in terms 
of capital growth or an increase in rent [1]. This idea is challenged, to some extent, 
by research from DECC suggesting that capital appreciation may occur following 
energy efficiency improvements [18]. However, the views of respondents accorded 
with the principal-agent problem as the dominant perception remained that they have 
little to gain from energy efficiency investment, not least as tenants wouldn't 
withstand a rent increase, they believed.  
'Unfortunately, much as we would like to be able to improve energy efficiency in our 
properties, it's effectively dead money as we'd never see it back. No tenant would be 
happy with a rent increase to help cover the costs.' (Landlord, 40 properties) 
It should therefore follow that were the landlord to be responsible for the payment of 
energy bills, they would be more likely to invest in energy saving measures. However, 
due to a number of factors including: a long established culture of tenants taking 
responsibility for energy bills, fears on the part of landlords that flat fees for energy 
will lead to overuse and substantial rises in energy prices within the UK, it is highly 
unlikely that landlords would take on this responsibility. Moreover, all respondents 
were clear that they considered the temperature of the home and energy costs to be 
firmly the responsibility of the tenant.  
'The temperature of the home is a very personal thing. Personally I wouldn't have my 
heating on above 20 degrees, ever. Now, if my tenants want to have it on at 25 
  
degrees all the time because they like it warm then that's up to them….as long it 
doesn't get in the way of them paying the rent.' (Landlord, 16 properties) 
This position is unsurprising as it would be very unusual for a landlord to pass 
opinion on tenants' decisions regarding energy use (unless they were in some way 
damaging the fabric of the property). It does, however, imply a strong element of 
choice on the part of the tenant. The landlord quoted above does not appear to 
consider that a poorly insulated home and/or one with an inefficient boiler for 
example, will cost more to heat than a better performing property.  
In order to further test the resonance of the principal-agent problem in the case study 
area, landlords were asked to consider a hypothetical scenario where they were 
responsible for their tenants' energy bills. Those that responded to this gave a clear 
impression that in this scenario, their interest in energy saving measures would 
increase substantially.  
'That would very rarely happen [the landlord paying energy bills] because it would 
simply be abused in many cases, but if that was the case then obviously I would want 
to make sure I was saving money wherever I could whether it's through insulating or 
whatever. It's just good business sense.' (Landlord, 50 properties) 
The discourse used by landlords in this context is significant here in so far as they 
tended to use the language of finance rather than energy savings when reflecting on 
this issue. It is therefore clear that landlords' motivations would be financially driven.  
However, while most landlords see no justification for taking on responsibility for 
energy bills, some did recognise the potential for high energy costs to impinge on the 
ability of tenants to meet rent payments. In this sense, an incentive does exist, to 
some degree, for landlords to help reduce tenants' energy costs. It is, however, 
  
unlikely that any action would be taken until the point where tenants were struggling 
to make rent payments and, in a climate of high demand for rental properties, 
eviction/non-renewal of tenancies and the replacement of tenants are arguably just 
as likely [9,10,11,12, 24].  
It does, however, seem possible that the progressive tightening of the budgets of low 
income tenants as the UK government continues to implement welfare cuts is more 
likely to compel landlords to take an interest in reducing tenants' bills. The work of 
Beatty et al [9,10,11,12], however, provides evidence that the response of landlords 
to tenants finding it difficult to pay their rent will depend on the dynamics of the local 
rental market. In buoyant areas such as much of London, many landlords will have 
the option of replacing struggling tenants with more affluent ones. Yet, in areas 
where the local rental market is dominated by low-income groups, they are more 
likely to work with existing tenants. This is true in the case study area, where 
landlords acknowledge the lack of diversity of tenants.  
'Yes, demand is high for rental properties here like it is everywhere but you have to 
think about what type of tenants on offer. This is a poor area and most people are in 
the same boat, so that dream middle class tenant doesn’t exist round here. The best 
you hope for is a tenant that is reliable and keeps the place nicely.' (Landlord, 16 
properties) 
Prioritisation of cosmetic improvements 
A key area in which the findings from this study add to our understanding of how 
landlords approach decisions regarding energy efficiency investment is in providing 
evidence of the landlords' prioritisation of cosmetic improvements over and above 
any other forms of investment in a property.   
  
Around half of respondents reported that they had made improvements of some kind 
to their properties in the last five years. The improvements reported were primarily 
aimed at improving appearance and function, including: decorating, new carpets, 
replacement of kitchens and bathrooms and the installation of new windows and 
doors.  There were two primary motivations for such improvements: the need for a 
general periodical upgrade and requests from tenants.  
One third of those that had made improvements considered that they had, in 
undertaking improvements, increased energy efficiency in some way: further 
evidence of the tendency to expect general improvement to lead to improved energy 
performance.  Whilst in some cases, it may be legitimate to expect this, for example, 
the installation of double glazing will yield both cosmetic and energy efficiency 
benefits, in other cases there is little or no relationship (e.g. a new kitchen).  
'We re-wired, put in new kitchens, decorated and put in double glazing, what more 
can we do?' (Landlord 50+ properties) 
Such misconceptions were common and reinforce the finding that respondents have 
a limited understanding of what is required to improve energy performance.  For 
most landlords, improvements which yielded only energy efficiency benefits (such as 
insulation) were seen as a lesser priority than those that enhance appearance and 
amenity such as new bathrooms, kitchens or carpets, for example. This strategy was 
pursued on the basis that tenants are perceived to attach little importance to energy 
performance, but are very concerned with appearance and functionality.  
'I've never known anyone to ask whether the loft is insulated but people do notice 
how old the kitchen is or if the carpets are stained.' (Landlord, 12 properties) 
  
The replacement of inefficient boilers and heating systems were also viewed as a 
priority by some landlords as tenants reportedly expect an effective heating system 
and unreliable equipment leads to more callouts.  It therefore seems reasonable to 
suggest that the replacement of central heating systems and/or boilers and the 
installation of double glazed windows are the energy efficiency improvements 
landlords are most likely to fund due to their dual amenity and energy efficiency 
benefits. 
The majority of respondents chiefly aspire to keep their properties well maintained to 
ensure they are 'liveable' and 'lettable'.  Providing a well-insulated property was only 
considered part of this by a less than five respondents.  
The housing market 
Several landlords cited the relative weakness of the local housing market including 
low rental yields and low equity levels as significant barriers to action.  The primary 
concern was that money invested in what landlords deemed 'non-essential' 
improvements would not be reflected in rent levels or property values.  The following 
quote illustrates this point, as a landlord recalls being quoted almost twice the value 
of their property to make various improvements to a property required by a voluntary 
landlord accreditation scheme, which would include bringing energy performance up 
to an E rating. An investment of this scale in such a low value property would push 
this landlord into negative equity.  
'I'm wary of trying to make a silk purse from a sow's ear. We've previously been 
quoted £68,000 to bring a £35,000 flat up to standard.' 
  
This quote also serves to highlight that the improvements that landlords are faced 
with will not be confined to energy efficiency and may include compliance with fire 
regulations and repairs to the fabric of the property, for example. Therefore, energy 
efficiency improvements form just one part of a host of investment considerations 
facing landlords and in the absence of minimum energy performance standards and 
given the pervasive view that improved energy performance does not impact on rent 
levels or capital values; they are unlikely to rank highly in landlords' priorities.  
A local letting agent introduced another dimension to this debate, suggesting that 
investment in non-essential improvements may be reflected in rent levels and capital 
values to a greater extent in 'better' neighbourhoods. For example, improving a 
property in a desirable neighbourhood to a higher standard can help ensure it 
remains competitive. He also added that higher capital growth in such areas enables 
and encourages such investment.  In low value areas the opposite is true. 
'There is a cut off point for rent in the area and if you create this little palace in the 
middle of [low value neighbourhood], no one will thank you for it. If you spend loads 
of money on it then you have to get that back through the rent and no one is going to 
pay more for your slightly better terrace than they will for the average one next door. 
The area serves a certain market- people on low incomes and benefits; there is a 
limit to how much they can pay in rent regardless of condition.' (Letting agent, 200+ 
properties) 
However, as previously outlined, research by the [15, 17] regarding the costs of 
upgrading F and G rated properties suggests that landlords in the study area may 
have been overestimating the amount required to bring their properties up to an E 
rating or above.  
  
Landlords' perceptions of the Green Deal  
The Green Deal was rejected by the majority of respondents, 26 out 30 of whom said 
they would not support their tenants to take out a Green Deal loan. Many of the 
concerns cited related to responsibilities placed on the landlord under the Green 
Deal. In particular they were concerned about the requirement to make repayments 
on the Green Deal loan during void periods or if tenants defaulted. Concerns were 
also raised about the potential issues that might arise around a change of tenant or 
the sale of a property as a result of having a Green Deal loan attached to it. 
Many were concerned that their properties might become more difficult to let with a 
Green Deal loan attached to them, not least due to potential misconceptions on the 
part of tenants that this is a conventional loan on which they would have to make 
repayments in addition to the payment of their energy bills. There was also concern 
about pay back periods, and many landlords felt that many tenants would not remain 
in the property long enough to witness any savings on their energy bills as a result of 
the works.  
'The savings are likely to be minimal and I know my tenants won't want to take on the 
debt as they perceive it. The majority of them are on low incomes and are opposed to 
debt. I think unless they were seeing the savings instantly then they will never go for 
it.' (Landlord, 12 properties) 
In this scenario, it was not felt that the 'Golden Rule' would be of much reassurance 
to tenants who many landlords felt would not trust that their bills would not increase 
as a result of the loan. This reflected broader concerns that any potential savings 
made will be negated by further rises in energy costs, therefore lengthening the time 
  
it takes to pay back the loan. More positively, it was generally accepted that, in the 
short term, tenants may benefit from warmer homes. 
'I accept that tenants would be getting a warmer property and that in reality may not 
actually be paying any more in terms of repayments and bills compared to other 
properties that had not had these improvements but it's easy to say these things in 
principle but in reality, who knows?' (Landlord, 40 properties) 
Landlords also expressed a general aversion to any kind of loan finance. The 
majority of respondents operated a business model whereby, with the exception of 
essential repairs, they would only make improvements to their property if they had 
sufficient cash or equity within the property.  
'I would only consider it if there was an essential repair that I couldn't fund any other 
way. Even then I'd rather sell the property on than resort to borrowing. Borrowing's 
not in my business plan. I only buy properties when I have the cash.' (Landlord, 18 
properties) 
Discussion  
The data presented provides a clear indication of a lack of willingness to act to 
improve energy efficiency amongst landlords, a conclusion reached by many 
previous studies in this area [1,3,5,20,21,25,32]. It reveals that, although their 
awareness of the energy performance of their properties is good (ostensibly as a 
result of EPCs) this had not translated into an increased propensity to improve them. 
Several possible explanations for landlords' reticence emerged from the study, some 
of which reinforced the findings of previous studies, such as a paucity of knowledge 
amongst landlords regarding possible solutions and their costs [29,30], the existence 
  
of the principal-agent problem and housing market factors (particularly high demand 
for rental properties).  
In relation to the principal-agent problem the findings emphasised the absence of 
any direct relationship between the energy costs incurred by tenants and landlords' 
business models. And, in terms of housing market factors, the study revealed more 
nuanced insights into the specific issues confronting landlords operating at the lower 
end of the rental market such as lower levels of equity and ceilings on the rent that 
tenants could or would be willing to pay.  
The study also revealed a number of previously unidentified factors including insights 
into landlords' business models and specifically how essential and cosmetic 
improvements are prioritised over energy efficiency improvements and the range of 
competing financial pressures landlords face.  It also revealed myths regarding the 
extent to which the energy performance of pre-1919 housing can be improved and 
overestimations of the costs associated with this. Misunderstandings were also 
evident in the belief expressed by several respondents that general improvements 
may also improve energy performance. Cultural and contextual factors also emerged 
in so far as poorly performing properties were considered to be the 'norm' in the case 
study area and the lack of competition from better quality properties acted as a 
further disincentive to action.  
In terms of the effectiveness of the Green Deal in addressing the problem of poor 
energy performance within the PRS, findings from this study suggest that the 
initiative is poorly suited to the addressing energy performance in the PRS. In 
essence, the Green Deal does not appear to have gone far enough towards 
mitigating the principal-agent problem. Respondents perceived the initiative to be too 
  
risky citing uncertainties around the impact of a Green Deal loan on the re-saleability 
of their properties and its attractiveness to prospective tenants. There was a clear 
sense of mistrust that safeguards such as The Golden Rule would function as they 
were intended to and landlords were particularly concerned about the need to make 
repayments on the loan during void periods. Critically, landlords were also sceptical 
that tenants would experience financial savings as a result of the Green Deal during 
their tenure, suggesting that the initiative is better suited to owner occupiers who 
both live in a property and have a longer term stake in it. 
A clear set of factors preventing landlords from acting therefore emerge and can be 
used to inform much needed further research into how energy efficiency in the PRS 
can be improved. These factors can be broadly categorised as follows: 
 lack of knowledge and misinformation regarding potential consequences of 
energy inefficiency and the range of possible solutions (exacerbated by a lack 
of time and technical knowledge amongst landlords) 
 lack of direct financial incentives to landlords to invest (compounded by 
lack of awareness of research to the contrary) 
 local and regional housing market factors including 'ceilings' on rent and 
property values in low value areas and associated lack of equity to aid 
investment. 
 cultural and contextual factors: poorly performing pre-1919 properties of 
the type pervasive in the UK have become accepted as the 'norm'. 
 transience within the rental market: occupants rarely have a long term 
stake in a rental property so are unlikely to contribute to the cost of energy 
efficiency improvements. 
  
 low trust in government initiatives amongst landlords.  
The study also identified a number of factors which might motivate landlords to act to 
improve the energy performance of their properties, which can be categorised as 
follows:  
 financial: many landlords' acknowledged the potential threat that high energy 
bills may pose in terms of tenants' ability to meet rent payments. However, 
landlords' responses to tenants who experience such difficulties will depend 
greatly on the dynamics of the local rental market.  
 maintaining attractive properties: the importance to landlords of keeping 
their properties in a good state of repair in order to protect their asset and 
attract and hold on to good tenants was underlined.  
 dual benefits: landlords' were more likely to invest in improvements that 
yielded both amenity and energy efficiency benefits.   
Conclusions 
As the PRS continues to grow and energy prices continue to rise, the need for a 
robust response to the pervasive energy inefficiency found within the sector grows 
increasingly urgent. Evidence from this and previous studies cited in this paper 
suggest that if policies and initiatives (whether regulatory or incentive based) to 
address this considerable challenge are to succeed in convincing landlords to take 
action then they should take account of three factors. First, they should be based on 
a detailed understanding of the business models within which all investment 
decisions taken by landlords are ultimately made, including local variations in 
housing market dynamics. Second, they must take account of both landlords 
  
concerns and what might motivate them, however ill-informed some rationales may 
seem.  Third, such policies should be accompanied by efforts to raise awareness 
amongst both landlords and tenants of evidence regarding the consequences of 
energy inefficiency and the likely costs and benefits associated with the full range of 
available solution. This will help ensure informed decisions can be reached and may 
also help empower tenants. These factors will also be critical in understanding 
landlords' likely responses to the provisions of the Energy Act forthcoming in 2016 
and 2018. 
 
This paper also underlines the need for further research into the barriers (both actual 
and perceived) faced by landlords and equally, the factors that may motivate and 
enable investment in energy saving measures. In particular, this paper draws 
attention to how barriers to and enablers of investment may vary according to local 
housing market dynamics and thus highlights the need to better understand how 
policies to encourage investment in energy efficiency may impact differently across 
different geographical and market contexts.  
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Notes 
1
 The private rented sector is a housing tenure comprised of privately owned 
properties being rented out. 
2
 EPCs provide information about a property's energy use and typical energy costs 
as well as recommendations about how to improve a property's energy efficiency. 
The give properties an energy efficiency rating of from A (most efficient) to G (lease 
efficient). EPCs are mandatory when selling or letting a property and a part of an EU 
wide directive. 
3
 Fuel poverty in England is now measured by the Low Income High Costs definition, 
which considers a household to be in fuel poverty if: they have required fuel costs 
that are above average (the national median level); were they to spend that amount 
they would be left with a residual income below the official poverty line.   
4
 A home that cannot be economically maintained at temperatures of 18 to 
21oC. Even when it is minus 1oC outside, the heating system should be capable of 
maintaining these temperatures inside.  
  
5
 HHSRS is the method used by local authorities to assess housing conditions. It is 
based on the principle that: Any residential premises should provide a safe and 
healthy environment for any potential occupier or visitor. 
6
 Defined as low-income tenants of rented housing most of whose rents are covered 
by housing benefit; and elderly owner-occupiers. 
7
 A 'decent home' is defined by the UK government as one which is 'wind and 
weather tight, warm and has modern facilities' (ODPM, 2004) 
8
 The Local Housing Allowance (LHA) is a housing benefit paid in the UK that helps 
those on a low income to pay the rent if they rent their home from a private landlord. 
From 2010, reforms were introduced which reduced the amount of LHA paid to 
tenants and paid the benefit to tenants who are expected to pass it on to the landlord. 
Previously, landlords received the payment directly from government. 
9
 Due to their construction, pre-1919 properties are difficult to insulate as they have 
no wall cavity and often have attics rather than lofts, reducing scope for insulation. 
10
 SAP is the official, government approved system for assessing the energy rating 
for a domestic property. A SAP Rating is a way of comparing energy performance of 
different homes – it results in a figure between 1 and 100+ (100 representing zero 
energy cost and anything over means you are exporting energy). The higher the 
SAP rating, the lower the fuel costs and the lower the associated emissions of 
carbon dioxide. 
11
 The lower the rating, the higher the energy costs and Co2 emissions. 
12
 See http://www.superhomes.org.uk/news/old-home-superhome-project-shortlisted-
for-award/ 
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